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APPRAISING MERGER EFFICIENCIES  
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
INTRODUCTION 
Mergers of business firms violate the antitrust laws when they threaten 
to lessen competition, which generally means a price increase resulting from 
reduced output. The principal statutory vehicle for addressing mergers under 
the antitrust laws is Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which condemns both stock 
and asset acquisitions where “the effect of such acquisition may be substan-
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”1 The statute 
itself neither defines “substantially . . . lessen competition” nor provides for 
an efficiency defense. As a result some courts continue to doubt whether the 
defense exists at all.2  Section 7 is enforced by both the Antitrust Division of 
the Department of Justice (“Antitrust Division”) and the Federal Trade Com-
mission (“FTC”). While private plaintiffs are also empowered to enforce 
Section 7 through both damages and equity actions, their impact on merger 
law has been relatively small.3 
Mergers of relatively small firms in competitive markets almost never 
pose the Clayton Act threats. When markets are more concentrated or prod-
ucts are differentiated, however, the threat of a merger resulting in higher 
prices looms larger.4 At the same time, a merger that threatens a price in-
crease may also enable the post-merger firm to reduce its costs or improve 
  
 * James G. Dinan University Professor, Penn Law and Wharton Business, University of Pennsyl-
vania. Thanks to Steven C. Salop, Gregory J. Werden, Richard Gilbert, Erik Hovenkamp, and Richard 
Brunell for helpful comments on a draft. 
 1 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012): 
No person . . . shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other 
share capital and no person . . . shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another 
person . . . where in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section 
of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to 
tend to create a monopoly. 
Prior to 1950, many mergers were challenged under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and a few are even 
today. Today, a few mergers are challenged under Section 1, but more are challenged under Section 7 of 
the Sherman Act. See 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 906 (4th ed. 
2016). 
 2 E.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Medical Center, 838 F.3d 327, 347–48 (3d Cir. 
2016) (neither Supreme Court nor Third Circuit has adopted the defense and the Supreme Court has “cast 
doubt on its availability”). 
 3 On private merger challenges, see 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 356 (4th ed. 
2014). 
 4 See infra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. 
704 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 24:703 
its product.5 Few areas of merger law are more controversial than the treat-
ment of such efficiency claims, which are often raised but almost never found 
to justify a merger that has been shown to be prima facie unlawful. The de-
cisions that credit claimed efficiencies as justification typically also find that 
the government failed to make out its prima facie case against the merger.6 
Thus, in those cases acknowledgement of efficiencies is simply dicta. 
Nevertheless, attitudes toward mergers are heavily driven by assump-
tions about efficiency gains. If mergers of competitors never produced effi-
ciency gains but simply reduced the number of competitors, a strong pre-
sumption against them would be warranted. But we tolerate most mergers 
because of a background, highly generalized belief that most—or at least 
many—do produce cost savings or improvements in products, services, or 
distribution. Those who think that significant efficiency gains are likely to be 
both present and strong in most mergers would prefer to give merging firms 
the benefit of the doubt, and perhaps adjust proof burdens accordingly.7 By 
contrast, those who believe that many mergers produce few or trivial effi-
ciency gains would narrow the defense or perhaps even eliminate it.8 
Acting jointly, the Antitrust Division and FTC (“Agencies”) have issued 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Merger Guidelines”), most recently updated 
in 2010, which set out the standards for merger review.9 The Merger Guide-
lines address both the elements of a prima facie case and the requirements of 
an efficiency defense.10 Under the Merger Guidelines’ approach, merger 
analysis takes efficiencies into account in two ways. First, certain categorical 
assumptions about efficiencies are made in determining where the line for 
prima facie illegality should be drawn.11 Second, however, the Merger Guide-
lines recognize a specific efficiencies “defense” that is available once prima 
facie illegality has been established; the burden of proof for an efficiencies 
defense ordinarily lies with the defendant, or the proponents of the merger.12 
  
 5 See 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 970–76. 
 6 E.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1224, 1227 (W.D. Mo. 1995), 
aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding substantial efficiencies from elimination of overhead expenses, 
but rejecting the FTC’s case on market definition grounds). On the burden-shifting framework applied in 
merger analysis see infra, text accompanying notes 131–133. 
 7 See infra, text accompanying notes 43–44. 
 8 See Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527, 1560–63 
(2011); Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 18 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 
833, 873–79 (2011). 
 9 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf 
[hereinafter 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES].  
 10 Id. § 10. 
 11 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 32–41.  
 12 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 32–41. 
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Recent empirical literature suggests that merger policy today is under 
deterrent. That is, current enforcement policy is more likely to permit an an-
ticompetitive merger than to prohibit a harmless one.13 At the same time, 
however, the fault appears not to lie with the efficiencies defense. The de-
fense has rarely been successfully raised to justify a merger after the govern-
ment has made out a prima facie case of illegality. Thus, the under deterrence 
problem must lie in the prima facie case itself. 
In highly competitive, undifferentiated markets anticompetitive price 
increases (or quality reductions) are unlikely to be a motivating factor for a 
merger. The post-merger firm still lacks significant market power, and the 
market is no more conducive to collusion than it had been prior to the merger. 
In that case efficiency gains must be the rationale for the merger. But as mar-
kets become more concentrated or differentiated, anticompetitive conse-
quences become more plausible. More concentrated markets encourage col-
lusion or other forms of coordinated interaction,14 particularly when there are 
only three, four, or a few more firms in the post-merger market.15 In markets 
that are differentiated by product or geography, mergers between relatively 
“proximate” firms in product or geographical space can facilitate unilateral 
price increases.16 This may also be true for markets in which information flow 
is limited or markets characterized by auction style pricing.17 As the case for 
  
 13 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 90–91. 
 14 The term “coordinated interaction” refers to both explicit price fixing and more tacit forms of 
collusion. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines give this definition: 
Coordinated interaction involves conduct by multiple firms that is profitable for each of them 
only as a result of the accommodating reactions of the others. These reactions can blunt a 
firm’s incentive to offer customers better deals by undercutting the extent to which such a 
move would win business away from rivals. They also can enhance a firm’s incentive to raise 
prices, by assuaging the fear that such a move would lose customers to rivals. Coordinated 
interaction includes a range of conduct. Coordinated interaction can involve the explicit nego-
tiation of a common understanding of how firms will compete or refrain from competing. Such 
conduct typically would itself violate the antitrust laws. Coordinated interaction also can in-
volve a similar common understanding that is not explicitly negotiated but would be enforced 
by the detection and punishment of deviations that would undermine the coordinated interac-
tion. Coordinated interaction alternatively can involve parallel accommodating conduct not 
pursuant to a prior understanding. 
2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 7. 
 15 See 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 916–18. 
 16 See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 6; 4 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, su-
pra note 1, ¶ 914. 
 17 See Gregory J. Werden, The Relevant Market Concept in Antitrust Law, in GLOBAL ANTITRUST 
ECONOMICS: CURRENT ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND LAW & ECONOMICS 117, 122–24 (Douglas H. Gins-
burg & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2016). See generally, Gregory J. Werden, The Relevant Market: Possible 
and Productive, ANTITRUST L.J. ONLINE, Apr. 2014, at 1, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publishing/antitrust_law_journal/at_alj_werden.authcheckdam.pdf. In an auction market it is often the 
buyers rather than the products that are differentiated. For example, even an auction for a fungible product 
could end up in a bidding war among two or three bidders, and eliminating one of these by merger could 
affect the price. 
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either of these anticompetitive outcomes becomes stronger, so does the 
strength of a noncompetitive explanation for the motivation underlying a 
merger. 
The “substantially lessen competition” language of Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act is not self-defining, and it has meant different things at different 
times.18 Lessening competition could be a reference to simple rivalry, or the 
number of firms in a market. Under that understanding, every horizontal mer-
ger lessens competition by reducing the number of rivals. The statutory 
phrase might also refer to general welfare, which would trade off possible 
consumer injuries against efficiency gains.19 Finally, it could be a reference 
to output and prices: a merger “substantially” lessens competition if it re-
duces output in the market and results in increased prices. This definition 
comes closest to the approach to merger policy reflected in the 2010 Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines and applied today by both the Agencies and the 
courts.20  
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was substantially amended in 1950 by the 
Celler-Kefauver Act,21 which was first applied by the Supreme Court in its 
1962 Brown Shoe22 decision. Neither the original language of Section 7 nor 
the amended language ever mention efficiencies as a defense, although there 
are some references to such a rationale in the legislative history of the revi-
sions.23 However, the statute does condemn only those mergers that may 
“substantially lessen” competition.24 Therefore, an efficiencies defense may 
be built in, so to speak, to the extent that cost savings can reduce or com-
pletely offset the threat to competition. That is, the very concept of substan-
tially lessening competition refers to competitive harm that outweighs any 
likely efficiencies. 
Brown Shoe did not raise the issue, but it clearly did not recognize an 
efficiency defense to a merger. To the contrary, the Supreme Court approved 
of the district court's analysis that the merger should be condemned precisely 
because it enabled the post-merger firm to produce shoes of better quality or 
at a lower cost, thus injuring its rivals.25 Five years later the Supreme Court 
  
 18 Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 19 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 64–70. 
 20 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 1. 
 21 Celler-Kefauver Act, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 18 (2012)). 
 22 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). 
 23 For example, during the debates Senator Estes Kefauver asked about a merger of two newspapers 
“in order to save the expense of operating in two separate buildings.” Senator Herbert O’Conor replied 
that such a merger would not be unlawful because if that were the only effect “competition would be 
stimulated rather than lessened.” 96 CONG. REC. 16,456 (1950) (statements of Sen. Kefauver and Sen. 
O’Conor). 
 24 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 25 See United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1959), aff’d 380 U.S. 294 
(1962): 
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reaffirmed that view, concluding that “[p]ossible [efficiencies] cannot be 
used as a defense to illegality.”26 There, the Court reasoned that although 
Congress “was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may also 
result in [efficiencies]” it “struck the balance in favor of protecting competi-
tion.”27 
But merger policy changed remarkably in the 1970s and the years that 
followed. The government did not take very seriously the general proposition 
that a merger should be condemned simply because it reduced costs or im-
proved products.28 Indeed, in 1968 the Antitrust Division's first set of Merger 
Guidelines acknowledged that “improvements in efficiency” should be 
treated as a mitigating factor in merger law.29 Nevertheless, the Antitrust Di-
vision concluded that the ordinary market concentration standards used for 
assessing merger illegality should be sufficient because challenges to mer-
gers of “companies operating significantly below the size necessary to 
achieve significant economies of scale” would be rare.30 In other words, the 
substantive standards of illegality already assumed and accounted for merger 
efficiencies. Beginning in 1982, the Merger Guidelines elaborated more on 
an efficiency defense.31 Since that time the defense has been expanded in 
successive editions of the Merger Guidelines, but the fact remains that the 
defense has almost never been asserted successfully against a prima facie 
unlawful merger. 
  
[I]ndependent retailers of shoes are having a harder and harder time in competing 
with company-owned and company-controlled retail outlets. National advertising 
by large concerns has increased their brand name acceptability and retail stores 
handling the brand named shoes have a definite advertising advantage. Company-
owned and company-controlled retail stores have definite advantages in buying and 
credit; they have further advantages in advertising, insurance, inventory control . . 
. and price control. These advantages result in lower prices or in higher quality for 
the same price and the independent retailer can no longer compete . . . 
See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Medical Center, 838 F.3d 327, 347–48 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(noting Brown Shoe’s rejection of efficiencies defense). 
 26 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). 
 27 Id. 
 28 See Richard J. Gilbert & Hillary Greene, Merging Innovation into Antitrust Agency Enforcement 
of the Clayton Act, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1919, 1927 (2015) (explaining that the 1968 Merger Guide-
lines were concerned with mergers which discouraged price competition and encouraged inefficient pro-
duction methods).There were a few exceptions. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. In-
dus., 414 F.2d 506, 515–18 (3d Cir. 1969) (condemning a merger between a manufacturer of rolling mills, 
used in the production of steel, and a manufacturer of the electric hook-ups for such mills, because the 
merger would create “the only company capable of designing, producing and installing a complete metal 
rolling mill,” and this “would raise higher the already significant barriers to the entry of others.”). 
 29 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, MERGER GUIDELINES ¶ 10 (1968), http://www. 
justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11247.pdf [hereinafter 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, MERGER GUIDELINES 29 (1982), http://www. 
justice.gov/archives/atr/1982-merger-guidelines. 
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While evidence suggests that current merger policy is under deterrent, 
an efficiencies defense rarely results in a successful rebuttal of an established 
prima facie case of a merger’s illegality—suggesting that the problem lies 
elsewhere. This Article begins by describing the burden shifting framework 
employed in challenged merger litigation under the Merger Guidelines in 
Part I. Part II, explores the welfare standard underlying the Merger Guide-
lines, particularly in relation to the efficiency defense, by analyzing and con-
sidering the general welfare and consumer welfare standards as well as wel-
fare tradeoff models. Part III analyzes how efficiency claims are assessed—
and how they should be assessed—by courts under the Merger Guidelines.  
I. “DEFENSE” OR PRIMA FACIE CASE? 
Today courts assessing mergers apply a burden shifting framework in 
which the government or private plaintiff challenging a merger must first es-
tablish a prima facie case of illegality.32 Most mergers are challenged for one 
of two reasons. First is the traditional rationale that the merger will reduce 
the number of firms in a market. In highly concentrated markets this will 
increase the likelihood of price fixing or other forms of coordinated interac-
tion that threatens to reduce output and raise prices. Alternatively, in product 
differentiated markets certain firms may be more adjacent in product space, 
usually because of product similarity or occasionally due to geographic prox-
imity; whereas other firms are more remote. A merger of two of the more 
adjacent firms can permit a price increase between those two firms while the 
rest of the market remains mostly unaffected. This “unilateral effects” theory 
has been quite upsetting to traditional merger analysis, and may not even re-
quire a market definition.33 The underlying principle is that a firm’s ability to 
raise its price profitability depends on the number of sales it will lose. If a 
firm acquires a close rival, fewer sales will be diverted away from the merg-
ing firms, and a price increase is more likely to be profitable.34 In auction 
markets, even if the product is undifferentiated buyers may not be. A merger 
  
 32 This burden shifting framework is generally identified with the decision in United States v. Baker 
Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982–83, 983 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See also discussion infra, text accompa-
nying notes 108–112. 
 33 See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic 
Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. OF THEORETICAL ECON. 1, art. 9, 14–15 (2010). For a simple, 
nontechnical explanation, see Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, ANTITRUST, Spring 
1996, at 23, 23. 
 34 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE § 12.3d (5th ed. 2015). On the history, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Re-Imagining Antitrust: The 
Revisionist Work of Richard S. Markovits, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1221, 1230–33 (2016). 
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that eliminates competition between, say, the highest and second highest bid-
der can also harm competition.35 
If the merger challenge’s initial analysis suggests that under either the 
traditional concentration theory or the unilateral effects theory the merger 
will increase prices, the burden shifts to the proponents of the merger to show 
efficiencies. These must be either cost reductions, product improvements, or 
other innovation that result from the merger.36 Whether this evidence of effi-
ciencies is sufficient to rebut the challenger’s prima facie case depends on a 
number of factors, including the particular welfare test that the merger anal-
ysis applies;37 the nature of the claimed efficiencies,38 the robustness of the 
evidence for them,39 and their magnitude in relation to the predicted compet-
itive harm; 40 and whether or not the claimed efficiencies are “merger spe-
cific.”41 
Today, the view held by the Agencies and expressed in the Merger 
Guidelines is that most mergers are socially beneficial because they lead to 
cost reductions or improved  output, but with a few exceptions.42 As a result, 
a background assumption about efficiencies is built into the initial analysis. 
Indeed, since the Reagan administration the government has challenged 
fewer than 2% of the mergers that are sufficiently large that they must be 
reported.43 This makes an efficiency defense theoretically relevant although 
perhaps not essential. One might conclude, as the 1968 Merger Guidelines 
did, that the market structure standards used by the Agencies are sufficiently 
tolerant to take the general run of efficiencies into account.44 
  
 35 See Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Choosing Among Tools for Assessing Unilateral Mer-
ger Effect, 7 EURO. COMPETITION J. 155, 173–74 (2011). 
 36 On the latter, see Gilbert & Greene, supra note 28, at 1929, 1939–40 (concluding that the Agen-
cies’ recognition of innovation as a qualifying efficiency must be more specific and empirically supported, 
and the Agencies must be more transparent about how innovation claims are evaluated). 
 37 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 64–128. 
 38 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 158–165. 
 39 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 131–138. 
 40 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 64–70. 
 41 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 120–193. 
 42 See generally, 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 1. See also, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES 49 (2006), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/2152 
47.pdf [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2006)]. 
 43 Fewer than 1% of acquisitions were challenged during the George W. Bush administration. The 
Obama administration was more aggressive, challenging about 1.5% of mergers. Even this number is 
lower than the long-term average of 1.8% since the Reagan administration. See Melissa Maleske, How 
Antitrust Authorities View Mergers and Acquisitions, INSIDECOUNSEL (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www. 
insidecounsel.com/2013/03/26/how-antitrust-authorities-view-mergers-and-acquisi. 
 44 See COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2006), supra note 42, at 49–59 
(listing numerous cases in which consideration of efficiencies guided an Agency decision not to challenge 
a merger). 
710 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 24:703 
Many mergers challenged for unilateral effects are evaluated under an 
economic “upward pricing pressure” model that predicts the change in the 
firms’ profit maximizing price before and after the merger.45 The models as 
applied often include a built in general “credit” for presumed efficiency 
gains, typically 10% of marginal cost,46 rather than seeking to quantify effi-
ciencies on a case-by-case basis.47 In practice this approach need not differ 
all that much from the structural approach taken in earlier editions of the 
Merger Guidelines that suggested that efficiencies were simply assumed in 
the market structure analysis. Under the market structure approach, predic-
tion of merger efficiencies becomes part of the government's prima facie 
evaluation.48 Without providing detail, the 2010 Merger Guidelines state that 
the Agencies themselves will “look for reliable evidence” of efficiencies in 
their initial assessment,49 and that the economic models that the Agencies use 
to evaluate unilateral effects “can incorporate merger-specific efficiencies.”50 
In sum, the Agency may simply assume efficiency gains of a certain magni-
tude or it may incorporate explicit evidence of such gains. 
Of course, an arbitrary efficiency credit given in advance of specific 
claims can either under- or overstate efficiencies. In practice, the process of 
merger analysis contemplates a fairly generalized efficiency credit at early 
review stages, but more detailed and case-specific inquiries later.51 In any 
event, no matter what the government's opening analysis contemplates, once 
a serious efficiency defense is raised in litigation the government must meet 
  
 45 See Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 33, at 11, 28–29; Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 71–75 (2010); Joseph Simons 
& Malcolm Coate, Upward Pressure on Price Analysis: Issues and Implications for Merger Policy, 6 
EUR. COMPETITION J. 377, 378–79 (2010). 
 46 On how efficiency claims are considered prior to a challenge decision, see Darren S. Tucker, A 
Survey of Evidence Leading to Second Requests at the FTC, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 591, 601–02 (2013). See 
also  Elizabeth M. Bailey et al., Merger Screens: Market Share-Based Approaches versus “Upward Pric-
ing Pressure,” ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 6–7 (Feb. 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Feb10_Leonard2_25f.authcheckdam.pdf; Serge Moresi, The Use of Up-
ward Price Pressure Indices in Merger Analysis, ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 2–4 (2010), http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Feb10_Moresi2_25f.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 47 See Dennis Carlton, Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 
619, 644 (2010); Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 33, at 8–9. But see Steven C. Salop & Serge Moresi, 
Comment on the Federal Trade Commission’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project (No. 
P092900) (Nov. 9, 2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/hori 
zontal-merger-guidelines-review-project-545095-00032/545095-00032.pdf; Werden & Froeb, supra note 
35, at 169–70. 
 48 See, e.g., 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 6.1, ex.19 (acknowledging 
that once a price increase is predicted, “[f]urther analysis is required to account for repositioning, entry 
and efficiencies.”). 
 49 Id. § 2.2.1. 
 50 Id. § 6.1. 
 51 James Langenfeld & Gregory G. Wrobel, Upward Pricing Pressure Analysis under the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, ANTITRUST, Fall 2010, at 21, 24–25. 
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it. The 2010 Merger Guidelines acknowledge that specific merger efficiency 
claims need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis; they list some important 
factors whose effects vary from one situation to another.52 To be sure, rele-
vant case law consistently insists on case-by-case evaluation, which naturally 
requires some kind of measurement in each individual case where efficien-
cies are claimed.53 
In 1976 Richard Posner advocated against any efficiencies defense that 
would require case specific measurement. He concluded that “the measure-
ment of efficiency (whether based on economies of scale, superior manage-
ment, or whatever) [is] an intractable subject for litigation.”54 A quarter of a 
century later, Judge Posner largely adhered to his position.55 Consistent ex-
pansions of the efficiency discussion in subsequent editions of the Merger 
Guidelines, as well as its frequent assertion in litigation, indicates that Posner 
did not have the last word on this subject.56 At the same time, litigants' general 
lack of success in establishing the defense suggests that as a practical matter 
he may be right after all. 
Mergers are not the only area where efficiencies are relevant to antitrust 
law. Many practices that are challenged under antitrust law's rule of reason 
simultaneously threaten competitive harm while promising efficiency gains. 
The purpose of the rule of reason in these situations is to determine whether 
the participants have sufficient market power to make an anticompetitive re-
straint plausible and, if so, whether the restraint really does threaten to harm 
competition by increasing prices or excluding rivals unreasonably.57 If such 
  
 52 See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10: 
The Agencies have found that certain types of efficiencies are more likely to be 
cognizable and substantial than others. For example, efficiencies resulting from 
shifting production among facilities formerly owned separately, which enable the 
merging firms to reduce the incremental cost of production, are more likely to be 
susceptible to verification and are less likely to result from anticompetitive reduc-
tions in output. Other efficiencies, such as those relating to research and develop-
ment, are potentially substantial but are generally less susceptible to verification 
and may be the result of anticompetitive output reductions. Yet others, such as those 
relating to procurement, management, or capital cost, are less likely to be merger-
specific or substantial, or may not be cognizable for other reasons. 
See also, e.g., United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (stating that 
claimed efficiencies such as increased future innovation are not verifiable, particularly in light of the fact 
that no contemporaneous internal documents discussed them; the government nevertheless lost on relevant 
market issue). On sufficiency, see Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 52–53 (D.D.C. 
2002) (holding that efficiencies were insufficient to overcome a high market concentration, whether or 
not they were verifiable). 
 53 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 90–95. 
 54 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112 (1976). 
 55 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 133 (2d ed. 2001). 
 56 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 36–53. 
 57 See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1500 (3d ed. 2010); 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Balancing, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 369, 371 (2016); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
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a threat is found, the proponents of the arrangement can defend the action by 
showing that the arrangement produces offsetting efficiencies.58 But even if 
the defense is successfully claimed, the challenger can still go on to prevail 
by showing a “less restrictive alternative” that would achieve the efficiencies 
but without the restraint's harm to competition.59 This less restrictive alterna-
tive analysis is a rough equivalent to the Merger Guidelines' requirement that 
claimed efficiencies be “merger specific.”60 That is, the proponents of the 
merger must show that they could not reasonably have attained the claimed 
efficiencies through some less harmful way other than the contemplated mer-
ger.61 As demonstrated below, the requirement that claimed efficiencies be 
“merger specific” makes a great deal of sense under a general welfare test for 
competitive harm from mergers.62 It makes considerably less sense, however, 
under the quasi-consumer welfare test that the Agencies actually employ.63 
II. ASSESSING MERGER EFFICIENCIES UNDER ALTERNATIVE  WELFARE 
MODELS 
How efficiencies are assessed in merger analysis partly depends on the 
underlying goals of the antitrust laws—in particular, on which definition of 
“welfare” the antitrust laws apply. As a matter of theory, merger efficiency 
analysis is one area where the choice of a welfare standard test matters to 
both the enforcement Agencies and the courts. Today, the principal debate 
over antitrust welfare tests concerns whether antitrust policy should adopt a 
  
The Rule of Reason (working paper, Jan. 2, 2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2885916. 
 58 See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 57, ¶ 1504b. 
 59 Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 927, 929 
(2016). See also 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 57, ¶ 1505. 
 60 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10. 
 61 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 63 (D.D.C. 1998) (observing that 
while merging hospitals presented significant evidence of cost savings,  
The critical question raised by the efficiencies defense is whether the projected savings from 
the mergers are enough to overcome the evidence that tends to show that possibly greater ben-
efits can be achieved by the public through existing, continued competition. The Defendants 
simply have not made their case on this point.  
See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Medical Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 351 (3d Cir. 2016) (in-
creased ability to engage in risk-based contracting not merger specific); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Staples, 
Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1090 (D.D.C. 1997) (rejecting an efficiency study submitted by the defendant 
that purported to show large cost savings, stating that “the evidence shows that the defendants did not 
accurately calculate which projected cost savings were merger specific and which were, in fact, not related 
to the merger.”). The court also rejected the methodology that the defendants used to calculate the cost 
savings, and found no support for the conclusion that two-thirds of the savings would be passed on to 
customers. Id. 
 62 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 184–189. 
 63 See discussion infra, text accompanying notes 190–191. 
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“general welfare” or a “consumer welfare” approach. As a basic matter, the 
general welfare test is more difficult to apply and makes merger challenges 
more difficult. 
A. Choosing a Welfare Model: Consumer Welfare Under the 2010      
Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
“General welfare” tests in antitrust are derived from a conception of 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, sometimes called “potential” Pareto efficiency.64 
Under this standard a practice is said to be efficient even though it produces 
both gains and losses, provided that the gains exceed the losses.65 The term 
“potential” Pareto is helpful for understanding such situations. A pure Pareto 
improvement implies only gains, or at least gains and indifference, for eve-
ryone—there are no losers.66 But a practice is efficient in the “potential” Pa-
reto sense if the gainers gain enough that they could completely compensate 
the losers, leaving the losers indifferent.67 In that case, ex post compensation 
from gainers to losers would turn the practice into a Pareto improvement.68 
Importantly, the potential Pareto test does not require that losers actually be 
compensated, but only that the gainers' gains be large enough to make satis-
factory compensation possible.69 For example, a merger that produced $5 
million in efficiency gains while raising aggregate prices by $4 million would 
be counted as efficient, assuming it did no other harm beyond raising prices. 
The gains in this example are large enough to permit the gainers (merging 
firms) to compensate the losers (consumers paying a higher price) fully, and 
still have some gains left over. Again, the fact that the post-merger firm does 
not actually distribute the gains to the consumers paying a higher is irrele-
vant. 
By contrast, a “consumer welfare” standard effectively requires a form 
of actual compensation.70 The $5 million efficiency gain in the example 
would satisfy the test only if at least $4 million of it were actually passed on 
to consumers, thus yielding prices that are no higher than they were prior to 
the merger. Here, if consumers suffer harm, it does not matter that producers 
are benefitted by an even greater amount. The merger that raises aggregate 
prices by $4 million should be condemned, whether or not offsetting effi-
ciency gains exceed $4 million. 
  
 64 For an introduction, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 2.3c. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 2.3c. 
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The choice between these two antitrust welfare models has been fiercely 
debated for decades.71 In 1978 Robert H. Bork famously described his ap-
proach to antitrust as adopting a “consumer welfare” model, when in fact it 
was based entirely on general welfare.72 And while both sides of the debate 
have strong supporters and detractors, the debate has had relatively little ex-
plicit impact on antitrust case law outside of the merger context. That said, 
in the Supreme Court’s 2013 Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc.73 
decision, all eight participating Justices appeared to accept a consumer wel-
fare model.74 
While the 2010 Merger Guidelines never uses the term “consumer wel-
fare,” that appears to be the definition the drafters had in mind when articu-
lating the tradeoff between competitive threats and efficiencies. The Merger 
Guidelines state that cognizable efficiencies must be “of a character and mag-
nitude such that the merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant 
market.”75 In making that determination, the Agencies consider whether the 
efficiencies are “sufficient to reverse the merger's potential to harm custom-
ers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that mar-
ket.”76 As a result, a merger will not ordinarily be approved unless it makes 
consumers no worse off than they were prior to the merger. Of course, where 
the effect of efficiencies passed on to consumers is sufficiently large so as to 
keep prices at pre-merger levels there is no consumer harm in the first place. 
And though the Merger Guidelines may seem to leave a small amount of 
wiggle room for approving a merger that actually results in a price increase, 
it has proven to not be very much. 
In fact, one is hard pressed to find any American antitrust decision 
where the court clearly found that a practice (merger or otherwise) actually 
injured consumers by raising prices, but then approved the practice by con-
cluding that consumer losses were more than offset by efficiency gains.77 
  
 71 See, e.g., Kenneth Heyer, Consumer Welfare and the Legacy of Robert Bork, 57 J.L. & ECON. 
S19, S26–31 (2014); Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2471, 2474–77 (2013); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago., 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 234 
(1985); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consum-
ers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 237–40 (2008); Robert H. Lande, Wealth 
Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 
34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 69 (1982); Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 
of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 660–67 (2010); Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2253, 2274–77 (2013). 
 72 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 107–15 (1978). 
 73 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 74 Id. at 2234–35, 2238. Justice Alito did not participate. 
 75 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10. 
 76 Id. The use of “e.g.” is very likely intended to suggest that the government might approve some 
kind of consumer gain as an alternative to price effects, but these are not stated. 
 77 Canadian antitrust law, which adopts a total welfare approach, includes one much debated deci-
sion, which both recognized that a challenged merger between two producers of liquefied gas would cause 
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That is, the cases tend toward a consumer welfare approach—even if they 
rarely articulate it. 
B. Welfare “Tradeoffs” 
Under either articulation of a welfare test, welfare “tradeoff” models 
attempt to guide legal policy by assessing both the harms and benefits of a 
particular practice and balancing them against each other. The best-known 
welfare tradeoff model for mergers was developed by Oliver E. Williamson, 
and applies a general welfare test.78 However, even under a consumer welfare 
model, assessment of tradeoffs is necessary. The lines of legality are simply 
drawn in a different place. In a general welfare model, legality requires that 
producer gains be sufficiently large to offset consumer losses, but consumer 
losses are still acceptable.79 By contrast, in a consumer welfare model, the 
efficiency gains must be so large that the resulting price to consumers is no 
higher than prior to the merger.80 Assuming that the savings show up in var-
iable costs,81 increased savings from efficiencies will cause the post-merger 
firm's profit-maximizing price to be lower. If the structural effects of a mer-
ger generally tend to push prices upward when efficiencies are not present, it 
will take larger efficiency gains to produce legality under a consumer welfare 
test than under a general welfare test.  
Williamson's welfare tradeoff model, illustrated by Figure 1 below, 
shows a market that was perfectly competitive prior to a merger, with price 
(P1) equal to cost (C1).82 The merger has two results. First, it enables the firm 
to raise its price from P1 to P2. Secondly, efficiencies resulting from the mer-
ger permit the firm to reduce its costs from C1 to C2. Triangle A1 represents 
the deadweight loss to consumers, while oblong rectangle A2 represents gains 
  
a price increase, but approved the merger because it was thought to produce even larger offsetting effi-
ciencies. Comm’r of Competition v. Superior Propane, Inc., 2003 F.C.A. 53, para. 57–58 (Can.); see Dan-
iel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrie, Rhetoric and Reality in the Merger Standards of the United States, 
Canada, and the European Union, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 454–56 (2005); Darwin V. Neher, et. al., 
Lessons from the Superior-ICB Merger, 12 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 289, 306–07 (2003); Richard O. Zerbe, 
Jr. & Sunny Knott, An Economic Justification for a Price Standard in Merger Policy: The Merger of 
Superior Propane and ICG Propane, in 21 RESEARCH IN LAW & ECONOMICS: ANTITRUST LAW & 
ECONOMICS 409, 416-18 (John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004). 
 78 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs, 58 AMER. 
ECON. REV. 18 (1968); see also 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 970–76; Robert Pitofsky, 
Efficiencies in Defense of Mergers: Two Years After, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 485, 485–87 (1999); Oliver 
E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 706–09 (1977). 
 79 Hovenkamp, supra note 71, at 2472–77. 
 80 Id. 
 81 On different types of cost savings, see discussion infra, text accompanying notes 158–171. 
 82 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 707 
(1977). 
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that accrue to the firm as a result of the merger-created efficiencies.83 In this 
case, while the efficiency gains are significant, they do not completely offset 
the price increase, so the price rises. Merger analysis under a general welfare 
test would require the fact finder to determine whether the area of triangle A1 
(consumer deadweight loss) was greater or less than the area of rectangle A2 
(producer gains). Williamson then showed that a relatively modest efficiency 
gain would be sufficient to make such a merger welfare increasing rather than 
welfare reducing under the general welfare test.84 By contrast, under a con-
sumer welfare test this merger would be unlawful because the post-merger 
price is higher than the pre-merger price.85 Williamson did not address that 
issue. 
  
 83 Id. at 708. 
 84 Id. at 709. 
 85 See Hovenkamp, supra note 71, at 2473 (“If consumers are harmed (either by reduced output or 
product quality or by higher prices resulting from the exercise of market power), then this fact trumps any 
amount of offsetting gains to producers and presumably to others.”). 
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Figure 1 
 
Williamson described his own model as “naive,” and it is subject to sev-
eral qualifications, some quite severe.86 First, the most common historical 
reason for condemning mergers is that they facilitate collusion, or “coordi-
nated interaction” in the terms of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.87 
Successful collusion reduces output and raises price above cost.88 But collu-
sion is a market wide phenomenon, not simply limited to the merging parties. 
As a result, mergers that facilitate coordinated interaction permit all firms in 
the market to raise their prices, a fact that has been borne out both theoreti-
cally and empirically.89 For example, suppose the merger in Figure 1 created 
a post-merger firm with a 40% market share, in the process facilitating col-
lusion with other firms. In that case, though the full 100% of firms in the 
market might likely collude and raise their prices, the efficiencies created by 
the merger would benefit only the post-merger firm, with its 40% market 
share. In order to assess the true social cost of such a merger, one must look 
at harm across all sales, including the sales of the firms constituting the 60% 
  
 86 Williamson, supra note 82, at 706; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 79, at 2480. 
 87 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 7.1. 
 88 See id. § 1. 
 89 See Martin K. Perry & Robert H. Porter, Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger, 75 
AM. ECON. REV. 219, 220 (1985); George J. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 AM. ECON. 
REV. 23, 31–33 (1950) (merging benefits other firms in the market); see also Matthew Weinberg, The 
Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 433, 436–38 (2008) (summarizing 
several empirical studies concluding that in most cases subsequent to mergers rival firms as well as the 
merger partners increased their prices). 
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of the market that did not realize any post-merger efficiencies—but merely 
enjoyed the price increase. All else being the same, the consumer deadweight 
loss would be two-and-one-half times larger than Williamson's figure sug-
gests. 
This critique actually had more force at the time Williamson published 
his paper in 1968 than it does today. At that time, courts were frequently 
condemning mergers on the basis of market concentration, despite relatively 
small (by today’s standards)  post-merger market shares, often on the order 
of 10% or less.90 As a result, if such a merger facilitated collusion, the price 
effects would very likely dwarf the efficiency effects. By contrast, today a 
merger of two firms, each with 20% market share, would very likely be chal-
lenged on collusion grounds only if one or more other firms in the market 
were also quite large.91 In any event, if the merger is condemned on the fear 
of market wide coordination, then the analysis must consider price effects 
across all firms whose coordinated prices rise, while the relevant efficiencies 
accrue only to the post-merger firm. In the Federal Trade Commission v. H.J. 
Heinz Co.92 baby food case, where the merger was challenged on concentra-
tion increasing grounds, the merging partners (Heinz and Beech-Nut) to-
gether controlled a little less than 35% of the market.93 In the Saint Alphonus 
Medical Center—NAMPA, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System94 case, also chal-
lenged on concentration increasing grounds, the post-merger firm accounted 
for 70% to 80% of the relevant market.95 Full assessment of efficiencies in 
either of these cases would require the court to consider the price impact on 
non-merging competitors. 
In unilateral effects cases, it is possible and even quite likely that non-
merging parties will increase their prices as well, although not by as much as 
the prices of the merging firms increase.96 For example, non-merging firms 
might reposition themselves in order to take advantage of the fact that two 
  
 90 United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272 (1966) (condemning the merger of two 
small grocery chains with a combined market share of 7.5% of a highly competitive market); see also 
1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, § 4 (identifying as “highly concentrated” a market in which 
the acquiring and acquired firm each had at least 4% of the market). 
 91 Assuming a concentration threshold of 2500 HHI, and a market of A=20, B=20, C=20, D=20, 
E=10, F=10, the post merger-HHI after a merger between A and B would be 2600, which the 2010 Guide-
lines would identify as highly concentrated. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, 
§ 5.3. 
 92 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 93 Id. at 718 n.14. 
 94 See Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Nos. 1:12-CV-
00560-BLW, 1:13-CV-00116-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *1 (D. Idaho Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 
775 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 95 Id. at *13. 
 96 See Gregory J. Werden & Luke M. Froeb, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 
in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 43, 46 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008). 
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rivals, now having become one, raised their price and reduced their output.97 
One likely result is that these non-merging competitors produce more but 
also charge higher prices, given that total market output is smaller as a result 
of the merger.98 Once again, the non-merging firms may produce additional 
consumer harm but no offsetting efficiencies. 
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines generally require that the post-
merger firm's prices be no higher than they were prior to the merger.99 If that 
is the case, the prices of non-merging competitors would not ordinarily in-
crease either, for they would be forced to match a downward rather than up-
ward price movement. That is, if merger efficiencies actually led to lower 
prices, not only would consumers of the post-merger firm benefit, but so too 
would consumers of other firms in the market that were forced to compete 
with the post-merger firm’s lower price. So the Williamson model errs in 
both directions, depending on whether the post-merger firm’s prices go up or 
down. 
A second, related problem with the Williamson model is that it assumed 
that A1 in the figure was the entire social cost of a merger. That might be true 
in some cases, but not necessarily in others. The merger contemplated by the 
model is highly profitable, producing gains equal to A2 (efficiency) + A3 
(noncompetitive pricing).100 A firm pursuing these profits would be willing 
to spend up to the value of such profits in order to obtain them. Whether the 
investments made in pursuit of these profits are themselves efficient would 
depend on the circumstances, but in at least some circumstances they would 
not be. For example, the firm might engage in noncompetitive pricing to beat 
down the value of a rival's firm before acquiring it.101 
1. Output Reducing Mergers Under a General Welfare Standard 
A third and quite significant problem with Williamson's naive model is 
that if the merger results in higher prices, the efficiencies must occur at output 
levels that are lower than they were prior to the merger. Of course, efficien-
cies might be so substantial that post-merger output is higher, and prices 
lower, than pre-merger levels. But in that case there is nothing to trade off—
both producers and consumers would benefit from the merger. The “tradeoff” 
  
 97 See Jonathan B. Baker & David Reitman, Research Topics in Unilateral Effects Analysis, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 25, 25 (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012); 
Werden & Froeb, supra note 97, at 51. 
 98 Gregory J. Werden, Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers I: Basic Concepts and 
Models, in 2 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1319, 1322, 1327 (2008). 
 99 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 2.1.1. 
 100 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs, 58 AM. 
ECON. REV. 18, 21 (1968). 
 101 See generally, Richard A. Posner, The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 
807 (1975). 
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model in Figure 1 comes into play only when the merger causes a reduction 
in output (a shift from Q1 to Q2 in the figure) but also causes significant effi-
ciency gains. 
The most common efficiency is the economy of scale—i.e., cost reduc-
tions that accrue as output is increased. The 1968 Merger Guidelines recog-
nized economies of scale as the only relevant efficiency.102 Over some longer 
run, even a merger that results in a short-term output reduction might facili-
tate economies of scale. For example, two firms might operate inefficiently 
small plants with a capacity of fifty units each. The new post-merger firm 
might sell eighty units, and an eighty unit plant might be more efficient than 
a fifty unit plant. But the merger itself does not create the modern eighty unit 
plant. Rather, it simply gives the post-merger firm two inefficiently small 
fifty unit plants. Perhaps one plant can be re-engineered and the other closed, 
but this does not follow naturally and it raises questions about whether the 
claimed efficiency was really merger specific.103 For example, perhaps either 
firm acting alone could have built a larger more efficient plant. 
Other qualifying efficiencies might also accrue at reduced output levels. 
But, while attaining efficiencies at lower output levels is not impossible, each 
claim must be explained and proven. For instance, the post-merger firm 
might reallocate production so that each plant is more specialized after the 
merger. Or the merger might facilitate cost reducing vertical integration by 
enabling better use of supply sources or distribution networks. Some effi-
ciencies, such as better management or better intellectual property, might 
certainly be attained at lower output; but these tend not to be merger specific, 
because they can be acquired by other means. Otherwise they are very diffi-
cult to prove.104 Still other efficiencies, like the increased ability to compete 
in a larger market, might be plausible but appear to imply that output will be 
larger after the merger.105 
One possibility for efficiencies at lower output is a merger that shifts 
production from one merging firm's obsolete, high cost plant to the other 
merging firm's more modern, low cost plant. In the Heinz case, the district 
court found that the contested merger would permit Beech-Nut, which had 
an obsolete plant, to transfer production to merger partner Heinz, whose plant 
was modern but underutilized.106 Such a transfer of output might reduce var-
iable costs of production even though aggregate output was lower than the 
output of the two firms prior to the merger.107 
  
 102 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, ¶ 10. 
 103 On “merger specific” efficiencies, see discussion infra, text accompanying notes 190–193. 
 104 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 721–22 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 105 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1224 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 
260 (8th Cir. 1995) (accepting defense that merging hospitals would be able to compete better at the 
regional level and would have less overhead and administrative duplication; Eighth Circuit denied the 
FTC’s request for an injunction, mainly for failure to show relevant geographic market). 
 106 H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 721. 
 107 Id. 
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One problem with this defense is that it proceeds from the premise that 
only one of the merging firms was inefficient, while the other was not. But 
the rationale for considering efficiencies is that the merger introduces a more 
efficient firm into the market.108 A merger between two firms that are both 
inefficient for reasons relating either to scale or technological obsolescence 
can accomplish that.109 However, if one of the firms is already efficient, then 
the merger does not add an efficient firm to the market; it only increases 
concentration.110 The rationale for approving such a merger is protecting the 
inefficiently small firm from losing out in a competitive struggle. In this case, 
for example, Heinz had an efficient yet underutilized plant.111 The ordinary 
competitive outcome would be that Heinz would produce more, particularly 
given its lower variable costs. Beech-Nut might go out of business or it might 
figure out ways to modernize. But protecting an inefficient rival from com-
petition is neither the rationale underlying merger policy in general nor the 
efficiency defense in particular.112 Of course, if the more efficient firm were 
to acquire the less efficient firm and, after cost reductions, produce just as 
much as it had prior to the merger, then there would be no harm and thus no 
illegality. 
The problem of efficiencies at lower output under a general welfare 
model disappears under the consumer welfare standard, because the merger 
would be approved only if output were at least as high after the merger as it 
had been before. Assuming the merger were prima facie unlawful, the pro-
ponents would have to show that efficiencies were so substantial that output 
would be as high or higher subsequent to the merger, and consumer prices as 
low or lower. 
2. The Assumption of Pre-Merger Perfect Competition 
A fourth problem with Williamson's model is also severe. Williamson 
assumed a market that was perfectly competitive prior to the merger but mo-
nopolized thereafter.113 Virtually no challenged mergers today fall into that 
category. Most mergers attacked on coordination increasing grounds occur 
in moderately concentrated markets where pre-merger prices are already sub-
stantially above marginal cost.114 The same thing is very likely true in unilat-
eral effects cases involving product differentiated firms where the merger 
partners are reasonably close to one another in product space and most non-
  
 108 See 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 901. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. ¶ 976b. 
 111 H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 721. 
 112 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 901. 
 113 See Williamson, supra note 100, at 21. 
 114 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 9, §§ 5.3, 7.1. 
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merging firms are more remote. In product differentiated markets where this 
is possible, pre-merger prices are almost never at marginal cost.115 When pre-
merger prices are above the competitive level to begin with, the situation can 
depart quite far from Williamson’s model, as Figure 2 illustrates. 
Figure 2 
 
Figure 2 shows the same market as Figure 1, with a price increase (P1 
to P2) and output reduction (Q1 to Q2) of the same magnitude.116 The differ-
ence is that the price in Figure 2 is already above marginal cost prior to the 
merger. In Figure 1 P1 and C1 are the same, while in Figure 2 P1 is higher 
than C1. This situation creates two notable differences from Figure 1. First, 
the total loss that results from the merger is greater. The triangular top part 
of A1, the consumer deadweight loss triangle, is the same size, but in addition 
the lower part of A1 represents lost profits to producers who are producing 
less as a result of the merger, and in an area where margins are higher than 
in Figure 1.117 Second, because output in Figure 2 is lower to begin with, 
given the higher prices prior to the merger, the efficiency gains are spread 
over a smaller output than in Figure 1. As a result, while A2 (efficiency gains) 
is clearly larger than A1 (consumer + producer losses) in Figure 1, in Figure 
2 it is not. 
As Figure 2 illustrates, a price increase of the same magnitude (P1 to P2 
in both figures), coupled with per unit efficiencies that are also of the same 
  
 115 Id. § 6.1. 
 116 See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI ET. AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 213 (4th ed. 
2005). 
 117 The profit change from an output decrease is the number of units multiplied by the margin. 
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magnitude, produces larger net welfare losses when the pre-merger margins 
were larger to begin with. The consumer-welfare based efficiency test in the 
Merger Guidelines does not require that the post-merger price be competi-
tive, though.118 It merely requires that the post-merger price be no higher than 
the pre-merger price.119 That means that the price reduction attributable to 
efficiencies must be at least large enough to offset the merger's propensity to 
increase prices when efficiencies are not taken into account. 
The figures assume that the output reduction resulting from the merger 
is the same in the two situations that they describe.120 Whether or not that is 
true depends on a number of factors, including the overall market structure, 
the degree of competition between the merging firms, the shape of the de-
mand curve, as well as the competitiveness of third firms.121 At one extreme, 
if two perfect competitors in a larger competitive market  should merge there 
will likely be no output reduction at all because, even collectively, they have 
no power over price. By contrast, the situation that Williamson contemplated 
was a duopoly of two firms behaving as perfect competitors prior to the mer-
ger (i.e., in Bertrand competition), but then having a monopoly thereafter.122 
In that case, output would go from the competitive level to the monopoly 
level—an extremely rare situation. 
In contrast, Figure 2 describes a market that was not perfectly competi-
tive prior to the merger. In that case, the magnitude of the output reduction 
is heavily driven by the degree of competitiveness between the merging par-
ties, and thus by the size of price/cost margins.123 In general, if the difference 
between the pre-merger markets is merely the intensity of interparty compe-
tition, then the output reduction will always be larger where the pre-merger 
market was more competitive to begin with.124 But if the difference is merely 
how closely the merging parties compete with third party rivals, then the 
merger's output reduction will be larger where the market was less competi-
tive beforehand.125 
If the merging parties hardly competed with each other at all prior to the 
merger, then the output reduction from the merger will be very small. Con-
versely, if the merging parties are extremely close competitors, then it will 
be large, approaching the duopoly to monopoly outcome in extreme cases. 
This of course is the rationale for unilateral effects merger theory, which 
  
 118 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Compare VISCUSI ET. AL., supra note 116, at 213, with Williamson, supra note 82, at 707. Thank 
you to Erik N. Hovenkamp for these observations. 
 121 VISCUSI, ET. AL., supra note 116, at 213; see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 12.1a. 
 122 See Williamson, supra note 82, at 706. 
 123 VISCUSI, ET. AL., supra note 116, at 213. 
 124 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10. 
 125 Id. 
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arose after Williamson wrote his article.126 However, another factor at play in 
unilateral effects analysis is the relative proximity of the next best firms who 
are not parties to the merger.127 For example, if the two merging firms are 
very close in product space, but firm three is also very close, then the output 
reduction will be relatively less to the extent that firm three is in a position to 
steal output from the post-merger firm. 
The problem of pre-merger supracompetitive prices illustrated in Figure 
2 is most evident and significant under a general welfare test. In markets 
where pre-merger price/cost margins are already high, it takes a much larger 
efficiency gain to offset a price increase and output reduction of a given mag-
nitude. Looking back across merger cases brought in the last three decades, 
one common characteristic is that the markets were already relatively con-
centrated prior to the merger.128 That suggests that the market illustrated by 
Figure 2 comes much closer to reality than the one suggested by Figure 1. 
III. ASSESSING EFFICIENCY CLAIMS 
In a merger challenge, the government has the burden of making out a 
prima facie case of anticompetitive effects.129 Under the consumer welfare 
test, this means establishing that the merger threatens a price increase in at 
least one market or a showing of some other effect that will cause a substan-
tial lessening of competition.130 
A. Burdens of Production and Proof 
If the government is successful in establishing its prima facie case, the 
burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the claim with a showing of mer-
ger specific efficiencies.131 This burden shifting framework is sometimes re-
ferred to as the “Baker Hughes”132 formulation, developed in that decision 
and later articulated by the D.C. Circuit in the Heinz case: 
First the government must show that the merger would produce a firm controlling 
an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and [would] result  
  
 126 On the history of unilateral effects analysis, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Reimagining An-
titrust: The Revisionist Work of Richard S. Markovits, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1221 (2016). 
 127 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 6.1. 
 128 See sources cited infra notes 145–146. 
 129 See supra Part I. 
 130 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10. 
 131 See infra text accompanying note 133. 
 132 E.g., Roger D. Blair, et al., Hospital Mergers and Economic Efficiency, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1, 66 
(2016). 
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[ ] in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market. Such a show-
ing establishes a presumption that the merger will substantially lessen competition. 
To rebut the presumption, the defendants must produce evidence that show [s] that 
the market-share statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the [merger's] probable 
effects on competition in the relevant market. If the defendant successfully rebuts 
the presumption [of illegality], the burden of producing additional evidence of anti-
competitive effect shifts to the government, and merges with the ultimate burden of 
persuasion, which remains with the government at all times.133 
The test, as formulated in these decisions, refers to mergers challenged 
on concentration increasing grounds, but the approach under unilateral ef-
fects analysis is similar.134 
Several academics and practitioners have observed that courts require 
stricter proof of merger-generated efficiencies than of predicted anticompet-
itive effects.135 This might seem odd in a system that ordinarily places most 
of the litigation burden on plaintiffs, but in fact it is not. To a significant 
extent, evidence concerning predicted price effects relates to the market and 
predictions of consumer behavior.136 By contrast, evidence of efficiencies 
  
 133 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting United States 
v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982–83 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) (citations and quotations omitted). See 
also Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 778 F.3d 775, 783 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(similar); In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 271–72 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
676 (2014) (similar, dicta); United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-CV-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 
203966, *64 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (similar); United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 
(D.D.C. 2011). See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Univ. Health, 938 F.2d 1206, 1218–19 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(citations omitted): 
The government usually makes a prima facie case by showing that the acquisition 
at issue would produce “a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the rele-
vant market, and [would] result [] in a significant increase in the concentration of 
firms in that market.”. .  . If the government makes this showing, a presumption of 
illegality arises. To rebut this presumption, the defendant must produce evidence 
that “show[s] that the market-share statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the 
acquisition[‘s] probable effect[] on competition” in the relevant market . . . “If the 
defendant successfully rebuts the presumption [of illegality], the burden of produc-
ing additional evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the government . . .’” 
[Some courts speak of a double shift: once the defendant meets the burden of show-
ing efficiencies the burden shifts back to the government, which is entitled to pre-
sent] “additional evidence of anticompetitive effects.” 
 134 See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 23 (D.D.C. 2015); Fed. Trade 
Comm’n v. CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 44 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 135 Daniel A. Crane, Rethinking Merger Efficiencies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 347, 348 (2011) (“[T]he 
government is accorded greater evidentiary leniency in proving anticompetitive effects than the merging 
parties are in proving offsetting efficiencies.”). See also In Re Ardagh Group, S.A., Fed. Trade Comm’n 
File No. 131-0087 (Apr. 11, 2014) (Wright, Com’r, dissenting), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/public_statements/568821/140411ardaghstmt.pdf (protesting that “the burden facing the 
agency with respect to the likelihood of anticompetitive effects should be in parity with that faced by the 
parties with respect to efficiencies”). 
 136 See, e.g., Crane, supra note 135, at 373. 
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typically relates to a firm's own internal production and processes. It makes 
sense that general market predictions and analysis—supported by widely em-
braced economic tools and observable by many—requires less proof than 
does a unique efficiency claim dependent on information that is often unob-
servable to outsiders. Or, as stated in the Merger Guidelines, “much of the 
information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the merg-
ing firms.”137 Further, information is asymmetrical: firms almost always 
know more about their own internal processes and the costs of changing them 
than any outsider, including the merger enforcement Agencies. And, even 
with this imbalance, merger enforcement remains under deterrent.138 
B. Price Effects of Marginal but Consummated Mergers 
If merger policy is to be fact based, then one must consider how well 
the current set of models and evidentiary requirements serve the goals of 
merger enforcement policy. If these requirements result in fairly routine con-
demnation of competitively harmless mergers, then a correction should be 
sought. The same would also be true if harmful mergers are routinely ap-
proved. In 2007, the federally created Antitrust Modernization Commission 
issued a call for more empirical work on the effect of merger decisions.139 
Since then, a large number of studies have examined the post-merger perfor-
mance of mergers approved by the Agencies (including mergers approved 
contingent on partial divestitures or other corrective measures).140 If merger 
enforcement is operating as it should be, then mergers threatening price in-
creases should be condemned and those that survive should prove harmless. 
While the empirical evidence is not unanimous, however, it strongly suggests 
that current merger policy tends to underestimate harm, overestimate effi-
ciencies, or some combination of the two.141  
The assumption must be that firms making acquisitions are acting ra-
tionally. Firms know their own business better than the generalist govern-
ment antitrust agencies do, particularly when the relevant information is spe-
cific to the firm(s) rather than the market as a whole. As noted above, that is 
almost always true of efficiency claims.142 Second, as profit-maximizing ac-
  
 137 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10. 
 138 See infra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 139 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 50 (2007), http://gov 
info.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf (urging the agencies to do more 
retrospective research on effects of merger enforcement decisions). See also Orley C. Ashenfelter et. al., 
Generating Evidence to Guide Merger Enforcement 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 14798, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14798.pdf. 
 140 See Ashenfelter et. al., supra note 139, at 4–5. 
 141 Id. 
 142 See discussion supra, text accompanying notes 135–138. 
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tors that are responsible to their shareholders, firms will usually make acqui-
sitions only if they anticipate profiting from them—and we should expect 
that they will perform due diligence in assessing the source of those profits. 
Not uncommonly, firms contemplating mergers hire expert consultants to 
evaluate proposed transaction, looking for likely sources of profit.143 
The due diligence point is doubly relevant given that the overall track 
record of post-merger firm value and profit performance is quite trouble-
some. A large portion of acquisitions ultimately contribute little or nothing 
to the value of the merging firms, particularly the acquiring firm.144 Thus, 
firms contemplating mergers are hardly wading into territory where profita-
bility is assured. As a result, one should presume that firms examine transac-
tions very carefully before moving forward. In turn, requiring firms to prove 
merger-specific efficiencies when such mergers are challenged should not be 
unreasonably onerous. In fact, a firm that has not already done so in advance 
is not behaving rationally. 
Assuming that post-merger market structure supports the rationality in-
ference, a firm that cannot convince itself that a merger will reduce costs or 
improve product quality must believe that a merger’s profits will come from 
post-acquisition price increases. The available data on post-merger product 
pricing following mergers in concentrated or product differentiated markets 
is not encouraging. Several studies have found that the returns  to merging 
are higher when industries are more concentrated.145 Indeed, consummated 
  
 143 E.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 82 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that the 
parties engaged in detailed pre-acquisition study directed by an independent consulting firm in order to 
come up with estimate of merger efficiencies “Sysco, USF, and McKinsey reviewed a back-breaking 
amount of information from the merging firms, analyzed historical integration data, modeled possible 
cost-savings opportunities, and built a new organizational structure around the companies’ combined cus-
tomer base, and designed detailed day 1, day 100, and year 1 plans for integration.”). Several consulting 
firms hold themselves out as acquisition consultants for this purpose. See, e.g., AM. FORTUNE, 
http://www.fortunebta.com/mergers-a-acquisitions/business-acquisition-services/ (last visited Jan. 31, 
2017); CHARLES RIVER ASSOCS., http://www.crai.com/engagement/analyzed-effects-merger-digital-stor-
age-and-networking (last visited Jan. 31, 2017); BAIN & CO., http://bain.com/consulting-services/ 
mergers-and-acquisitions/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2017). 
 144 See BARBARA S. PETITT & KENNETH R. FERRIS, VALUATION FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
8 (2d ed. 2013) (stating that the value of acquired firms will go up in the short term, while value of the 
acquirer declines in both short and medium terms); G.A. Jarrell et. al., The Market for Corporate Control: 
The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 66 (1988). A classic study if David J. Ra-
venscraft & Frederic M. Scherer, The Profitability of Mergers 14 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Working Paper 
No. 136, 1986), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/profitability-mergers/ 
wp136.pdf (finding merged firms to be significantly less profitable than a control group that had not 
merged). 
 145 Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis, 80 AM. ECON. 
REV. 107, 119 (1990) (greater profitability and incentives to merge in more concentrated industries); Dick 
Hackbarth & Jianjun Miao, The Dynamics of Mergers and Acquisitions in Oligopolistic Industries, 36 J. 
ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 585, 604 (2012); see generally Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust 
Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2003); Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, Economic Analysis 
of Differentiated Products Mergers Using Real World Data, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 321 (1997). 
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mergers in highly concentrated markets subject to close government scrutiny 
tend to yield higher prices.146 In one FTC study, whose results appear to be 
very robust, grocery store mergers in concentrated markets produced signif-
icant increases in product prices, while those in less concentrated markets 
tended to produce price decreases.147 Similarly, most studies of carefully 
scrutinized but ultimately approved airline mergers indicate post-acquisition 
  
 146 E.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? 
Evidence from Consummated Mergers, 57 J.L. & ECON. S67, S74 (2014) (relying on studies finding higher 
post-merger prices in a wide assortment of industries); Orley Ashenfelter & Daniel Hosken, The Effect of 
Mergers on Consumer Prices Evidence from Five Mergers on the Enforcement Margin, 53 J. L. & ECON. 
417, 455–58 (2010) (increases in four out of five analyzed mergers); Orley C. Ashenfelter et al., The Price 
Effects of a Larger Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool, 5 AMERICAN ECON. J.: 
ECON. POLICY 239, 259 (2013); Matthew Weinberg, The Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 4 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 433, 434 (2008) (prices generally increase after mergers in concentrated mar-
kets); see generally, Awi Federgruen & Margaret Pierson, The Impact of Horizontal Mergers and Acqui-
sitions in Price Competition Models (Harv. Bus. School Working Paper No. 12-031, 2011), 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/12-031.pdf; Jonathan B. Baker & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 
Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 386 (1999); see 
also Michael D. Whinston, Antitrust Policy Toward Horizontal Mergers, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORG. 
2371, 2425–35 (M. Armstrong & R. Porter eds., 2007) (including a survey of empirical studies); Michael 
J. Doane, et al, Predicting Price Effects from Retail Mergers 2 (Vanderbilt Univ. Owen Graduate Sch. of 
Mgmt. Working Paper No. 2034464, 2013); Robert B. Kulick, Horizontal Mergers, Prices, and Produc-
tivity 2 (SSRN Working Paper, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2637961 (finding price increases exceeding productivity cost savings in mergers in the 
ready-mix concrete industry subsequent to promulgation of 1982 Merger Guidelines). 
 147 Daniel Hosken et al., Do Retail Mergers Affect Competition? Evidence from Grocery Retailing 
1, 3 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Bureau of Econ. Working Paper No. 313, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/reports/do-retail-mergers-affect-competition%C2%A0-evidence-grocery-retail-
ing/wp313.pdf; see also David E. Davis, Price and Promotion Effects of Supermarket Mergers, 8 J. 
AGRIC. & FOOD INDUS. ORG. 1, 1 (2010). 
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price increases, often substantial.148 The same thing is generally true of mer-
gers in banking,149 health care,150 and health insurance.151 Whether any of 
these mergers created significant offsetting efficiencies is hard to say—but it 
is apparent that whatever their significance, the magnitude of the efficiencies 
were not sufficient to offset price increases. As a result, these mergers should 
have been challenged under the standards articulated in the Merger Guide-
lines. The data shows that no general case can be made that merger policy as 
applied today is over deterrent, either because prima facie cases are too easy 
  
 148 Severin Borenstein, Airline Mergers, Airport Dominance, and Market Power. 80 AM. ECON. 
REV. 400, 402 (1990) (merger of TWA and Ozark airlines led to price increases 9% above industry aver-
ages); John Kwoka & Evgenia Shumilkina, The Price Effect of Eliminating Potential Competition: Evi-
dence from an Airline Merger, 58 J. INDUS. ECON. 767, 769 (2010) (examining USAir/Piedmont merger: 
large price effects where the two airlines were actual competitors; smaller but positive price effects where 
one airline was a potential competitor); E. Han Kim & Vijay Singal, Mergers and Market Power: Evi-
dence from the Airline Industry, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 549, 550 (1993); Craig T. Peters, Evaluating the 
Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry 49 J. L. & ECON. 627, 647 
(2006). One contrary study is Dennis W. Carlton, et al., Are Legacy Airline Mergers Pro- or Anti-Com-
petitive?  Evidence from Recent U.S. Airline Mergers (working paper, Oct. 25, 2016), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2851954 (finding improved post-merger perfor-
mance). 
 149 Robin A. Prager and Timothy H. Hannan, Do Substantial Horizontal Mergers Generate Signifi-
cant Price Effects? Evidence from the Banking Industry, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 433, 450 (1998) (bank mer-
gers in more concentrated markets significantly increased market power). 
 150 Jose R. Guardado et al., The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Health Insurers: A Case Study of 
UnitedHealth-Sierra, 16 HEALTH MGMT. POL’Y & INNOVATION 1, 2 (2013) (health insurers; case study 
showing post-merger price increases); Deborah Haas-Wilson & Christopher Garmon, Hospital Mergers 
and Competitive Effects: Two Retrospective Analysis, 18 J. ECON. OF BUS. 17, 30 (2011) (finding signif-
icant price increases following merger of Evanston Northwestern and Highland Park Hospitals in greater 
Chicago); Leemore Dafny, Estimation and Identification of Merger Effects: An Application to Hospital 
Mergers, 52 J.L. & ECON. 523, 544 (2009) (hospitals; similar); Steven Tenn, The Price Effects of Hospital 
Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction, 18 INT’L J. ECON. OF BUS. 65, 79 (2011) (find-
ing large price effect from a closely scrutinized but approved merger); Ranjani A. Krishnan & Hema 
Krishnan, Effects of Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions on Prices, 56 J. BUS. RES. 647, 655 (2003) (higher 
prices and margins). 
 151 See Leemore S. Dafny, Evaluating the Impact of Health Insurance Industry Consolidation: 
Learning from Experience, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 1 (Nov. 2015), http://www.commonwealth 
fund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2015/nov/evaluating-insurance-industry-consolidation; see generally 
Leemore Dafny et al., Paying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in the U.S. Health Insurance 
Industry, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1161 (2012). 
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to make or qualifying efficiencies are too difficult to prove.152 Regardless, 
more work certainly needs to be done in this area.153 
These studies do not, and could not, assess the price effects of mergers 
that were successfully challenged or abandoned. However, it seems highly 
unlikely that the Agencies systematically challenge many harmless mergers 
while letting many harmful ones go through. While individual errors are pos-
sible, the consummated mergers reported in these studies must be regarded 
as more benign than those mergers that were never completed because of a 
successful government challenge. 
These findings also suggest that traditional concentration increasing 
merger analysis must be taken seriously. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
(“HHI”) numbers in the 2010 Merger Guidelines were revised upwards from 
those in previous versions of the Guidelines.154 The Merger Guidelines prom-
ulgated between 1982 and 1992 identified an HHI of 1800 as “highly con-
centrated,” while the 2010 Guidelines have moved that number to 2500.155 
This shift may have been a result of a common complaint about enforcement 
policy between 1992 and 2010—that the Agencies did not really follow the 
Merger Guidelines.156 During that period, the Agencies in fact challenged 
mergers facilitating coordinated interaction only on concentration thresholds 
  
 152 For a more pessimistic conclusion drawn by one prominent industrial organization economist, 
see JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. 
POLICY 156, 158 (2015) (a comprehensive study concluding that “For all cases in which the agencies 
challenged mergers, the outcome was nonetheless an average price increase of 7.71 percent, indicating 
incorrect determinations or ineffective remedies…. [M]ost studied mergers result in competitive harm, 
usually in the form of higher price.”); see also id. at 155 (“Of all mergers that resulted in price increases, 
the agencies acted in only 38 percent of cases, suggesting substantial under-enforcement . . . .”). See also 
Michael Vita & F. David Osinski, Johns Kwoka’s Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Critical 
Review (Fed. Trade Comm’n Working Paper, Dec. 22, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888485 (reviewing Kwoka book). 
 153 See Gregory J. Werden, Inconvenient Truths on Merger Retrospective Studies, 3 J. ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT 287, 288 (2015) (questioning approach taken by several of the studies showing price in-
creases). 
 154 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 5.3. 
 155 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.5 (1992), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/hmg.pdf. 
 156 The American Antitrust Institute made this complaint rather forcefully. See, e.g., The Next Anti-
trust Agenda: The American Antitrust Institute’s Transition Report on Competition Policy to the 44th 
President of the United States, AM. ANTITRUST INST. 141 (2008), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/ 
files/Mergers%20Chapter%20from%20%20AAI%20Transition%20Report_100520082108.pdf; see also 
Deborah L. Feinstein, The Revised Merger Guidelines: Did the Agencies Heed the Lessons of the Past?, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE 3 (Oct. 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/ 
antitrust_source/Oct10_Feinstein10_21f.authcheckdam.pdf. The HHI, or Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is 
the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms in the market. On use of the HHI in merger analysis, 
see HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, § 12.4a. For example, a market with four 20% firms and two 10% firms 
would have an HHI of 202+ 202+ 202+ 202+ 102 + 102 or 2200. Id. It would be considered moderately 
concentrated under the Guidelines. Id. 
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far higher than the Guidelines suggested.157 Whether the revision was justi-
fied on the basis of the empirical evidence is difficult to say, but both pre-
dictability interests in policy making as well as the historical record suggest 
that the 2010 Merger Guidelines need to be enforced more literally than were 
the predecessors. 
C. Estimating Merger-Induced Variable Cost Savings 
The approach taken in the 2010 Merger Guidelines requires not only 
that significant efficiencies be proven, but also that these be sufficiently 
“passed on” to consumers that that the post-merger price is no higher than 
the pre-merger price.158 The main ingredients in computing pass through are 
the nature of the cost savings and the elasticity of demand facing the post-
merger firm.159 Variable costs savings will show up in marginal cost and thus 
be calculated directly into the post-merger firm's prices. By contrast, fixed 
costs do not ordinarily affect the price and thus would not be passed through, 
at least in the short run.160 However, in practice the line between fixed and 
variable costs is fairly soft, depending on such factors as use depreciation and 
the length of the “run” that one is looking at.161 For example, over the long 
run, increased investment in fixed cost infrastructure or IP rights could pro-
duce lower consumer prices, but these effects are unlikely to show up imme-
diately.162 Empirically, there is some evidence that upward changes in costs 
are more readily passed through than downward changes, at least over the 
short run.163 Pass through is rarely 100%, but where a firm possesses some 
level of market power, a certain percentage of variable cost savings should 
be passed on.164 By contrast, under perfect competition165 in an undifferenti-
ated product, cost reductions resulting from efficiencies that accrue to a sin-
gle firm or a small number of firms are not passed on. A competitive firm 
  
 157 Feinstein, supra note 156, at 3. 
 158 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 6.1. 
 159 Id. 
 160 See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 740. 
 161 See id. 
 162 On the problems in classifying costs as fixed or variable for antitrust purposes, see id. 
 163 Robert A. Ritz, The Simple Economics of Asymmetric Cost Pass-Through 9 (Univ. of Cambridge 
Energy Policy Research Grp., Working Paper No. 1515, 2015), http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/ 
research/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1515.pdf; see generally Sam Peltzman, Prices Rise Faster than They Fall, 
108 J. POL. ECON. 466 (2000). 
 164 See Luke M. Froeb & Gregory J. Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mer-
gers Among Sellers of a Homogeneous Product, 58 ECON. LETTERS 367, 367 (1998); Jerry A. Hausman 
& Gregory K. Leonard, Efficiencies from the Consumer Viewpoint, 7 GEO. L. REV. 707, 727 (1999); 
Gregory J. Werden, A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of Differen-
tiated Products, 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 409, 409 (1996). 
 165 See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 280 (7th ed. 2015). 
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will increase its output but, facing a horizontal demand curve, has no incen-
tive to reduce its price. 
In computing the effects of downward changes in variable costs, care 
must be taken that the effects relate properly to the predicted impact on over-
all costs. This is particularly true for manufactured products whose principal 
costs include raw materials, power, labor, or other inputs whose costs are not 
readily affected by the merger. For example, while generic raw materials are 
a variable cost, mergers rarely have a significant impact on material acquisi-
tion costs. The Heinz baby food case illustrates some of the problems.166 The 
defendants claimed that variable costs were roughly 43% lower in the acquir-
ing firm’s modern facility.167 The court found the figure to be much less, more 
in the range of 20%.168 More importantly, however, were some other factors. 
First, the cost savings applied only to the production that was shifted from 
the obsolete plant—the production that was already located in the more effi-
cient plant enjoyed no further cost savings.169 
Second, variable cost savings almost never apply to all variable costs, 
and in many cases they may apply only to a small percentage. To illustrate, 
in the making of strained peas for baby food, both the peas and the processing 
are variable costs. However, the merger does nothing to change the market 
price of peas. Suppose that the variable cost of producing a $100 batch of 
strained peas is $90 for raw materials (peas) and $10 for processing. A very 
substantial 20% reduction in the cost of processing will reduce the $10 pro-
cessing costs to $8, but it does nothing to the cost of the peas. As a result this 
20% reduction in processing cost amounts to a 2% reduction in overall cost.170 
The previously noted across-the-board assumptions of 10% cost reductions 
in first pass merger assumptions assume that overall variable costs decline as 
a result of the merger.171 That assumption is probably highly optimistic across 
a wide variety of industries, depending on what percentage of variable costs 
are actually reduced by the more efficient reduction that the merger promises. 
Raw materials, labor, and utilities are all components of variable costs, but 
few mergers do anything to change the per unit cost of these inputs. 
D. Measurement Difficulties 
Assessing the overall impact of a merger subject to significant, evidence 
based efficiency claims is difficult. The 2010 Merger Guidelines suggests the 
  
 166 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 167 Id. at 721. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 See id.; see also 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 974 (providing an example of how 
reduced production costs do not reflect the total overall costs). 
 171 See discussion supra, text accompanying note 46. 
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difficulty by its highly general statement on “balancing” anticompetitive ef-
fects against claimed efficiencies: 
The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger, the greater must be 
the cognizable efficiencies, and the more they must be passed through to customers, 
for the Agencies to conclude that the merger will not have an anticompetitive effect 
in the relevant market. When the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger is 
likely to be particularly substantial, extraordinarily great cognizable efficiencies 
would be necessary to prevent the merger from being anticompetitive. In adhering 
to this approach, the Agencies are mindful that the antitrust laws give competition, 
not internal operational efficiency, primacy in protecting customers. 
In the Agencies’ experience, efficiencies are most likely to make a difference in 
merger analysis when the likely adverse competitive effects, absent the efficiencies, 
are not great. Efficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly or near-mo-
nopoly. Just as adverse competitive effects can arise along multiple dimensions of 
conduct, such as pricing and new product development, so too can efficiencies op-
erate along multiple dimensions. Similarly, purported efficiency claims based on 
lower prices can be undermined if they rest on reductions in product quality or va-
riety that customers value.172 
The Merger Guidelines contain nothing more precise relating the mag-
nitude of required efficiencies to the threat level. 
Assessing mergers under a consumer welfare test is simpler than as-
sessing them under a general welfare test, at least until one gets to the prob-
lem of estimating pass through. Under either standard, once the requirements 
for a prima facie case have been met, administering merger policy with an 
efficiency defense requires the challenger (and the courts) to find some way 
to consider both price effects and efficiency effects.173 Literal “balancing” of 
competitive harms against efficiency gains is virtually impossible.174 Balanc-
ing requires the fact finder to come up with cardinal (i.e., specific unit) meas-
urements, and then net them out against each other.175 Competitive harms and 
efficiency effects are rarely amenable to such a process. Rather, the Agencies 
and the courts employ a very rough scale to conclude that the larger the pre-
dicted price increase or likelihood of anticompetitive effects, the greater the 
showing of efficiencies will be required.176 
  
 172 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 6.1. 
 173 For an argument that false positives are less important than false negatives because price-increas-
ing mergers cannot readily be corrected by other antitrust provisions such as § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman 
Act, see Lawrence M. Frankel. The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review: Stacking the 
Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 171 (2008). 
 174 See 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 976c (“‘Balancing’ implies an ability to assign 
a common unit of measurement to the two things being balanced, and determine which outweighs the 
other. Except in the clearest cases, this is simply not what courts are capable of doing.”); see generally 
Hovenkamp, supra note 57. 
 175 Hovenkamp, supra note 57, at 173. 
 176 Id. at 373–74. 
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Under a general welfare test, the fact finder must make cardinal assess-
ments of both harms and benefits.177 Analyzing a merger would require com-
putation of the deadweight loss accruing to consumers, the magnitude of ef-
ficiency gains (cost savings per unit multiplied by the number of units of 
post-merger production), and then netting these two numbers against one an-
other.178 The merger is efficient, and thus lawful, if the efficiency gains out-
weigh the deadweight loss.179 This analysis requires information not merely 
about the price impact of the merger, but also about the shape of the demand 
curve and price-cost margins before and after the merger. For example, the 
mergers in Figure 1 and Figure 2 above have the same output reduction and 
price increase, but losses in Figure 2 are greater than in Figure 1 because 
price-cost margins are higher, both prior and subsequent to the merger. Com-
puting deadweight loss requires knowledge not only about the price-cost 
margin, but also about the shape of the demand curve in the region between 
the actual price and the competitive price.180 
By contrast, under a consumer welfare test one needs to know only 
whether the merger will cause output to go down and prices to go up—that 
is, whether there will be any increase in consumer prices at all. This requires 
information about the predicted price impact of the merger, offset by the ef-
ficiency reduction.181 Thus, the biggest difference between the two standards 
is that under a general welfare standard, the magnitude of efficiencies will 
have to be traded against consumer welfare losses. But, under a consumer 
welfare standard, the price impact of efficiencies will have to be traded 
against any upward pressure on price. That latter number is nearly always 
easier to determine.182 
Both approaches can produce both easy and hard cases. The easiest 
cases, of course, will be mergers in competitive markets or where entry is 
easy and there clearly could not be a durable price increase. But in those cases 
efficiencies need not be measured at all, because there is no prima facie case 
of illegality.183 At the other extreme will be highly threatening mergers where 
the evidence for proffered efficiencies is weak. 
One unique complicating factor in merger analysis under a consumer 
welfare test is the pass through requirement. Pass through considers the ex-
tent to which reduced costs resulting from efficiency gains are passed on to 
consumers—principally by lower prices—but conceivably by higher quality 
  
 177 Id. at 379. 
 178 Id. at 379–80. 
 179 Id. at 382. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Hovenkamp, supra note 57, at 380. 
 182 Id. at 383. 
 183 Id. at 380. 
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or improved services as well.184 Pass through is irrelevant under a general 
welfare test, and thus need not be computed; all that would matter is whether 
efficiency gains outweigh consumer welfare losses. The approach taken by 
the 2010 Merger Guidelines, however, requires that post-merger prices be no 
higher than pre-merger prices.185 This does not require a precise measurement 
of pass through, but only that pass through be shown to be at least large 
enough to offset fully any price increase threatened by the merger.186 Thus, 
once the challenger makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to show both offsetting efficiencies and that a sufficient amount of 
the savings will be passed on to correct the price increase. Furthermore, “the 
greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger, the greater must 
be the cognizable efficiencies, and the more they must be passed through to 
customers . . . .”187 Initially this requirement was treated with a great deal of 
skepticism, mainly because it was thought to be too difficult to prove.188 But 
today, techniques are being developed that permit at least an approximation 
of pass through.189 
  
 184 On the difficulties in measuring merger-induced changes in quality, see Roger D. Blair et al., 
Hospital Mergers and Economic Efficiency, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1, 44–45 (2016) (focusing on hospital 
mergers). 
 185 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 2.1. 
 186 Id. § 10. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Timothy J. Muris, The Government and Merger Efficiencies: Still Hostile After All These Years, 
7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 729, 733 (1999) (arguing against rigid pass-on requirement); Robert Pitofsky, 
Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global Economy, 81 GEO. L.J. 195, 207–
08 (1993) (proof of pass-on requirement would be too difficult); accord Joseph F. Brodley, Proof of Effi-
ciencies in Mergers and Joint Ventures, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 584 (1996) (agreeing with Pitofsky); see 
also Dennis A. Yao & Thomas N. Dahdouh, Information Problems in Merger Decision Making and Their 
Impact on Development of an Efficiencies Defense, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 23, 41–43 (1993) (indicating that 
a strict pass-on requirement “may foreclose any consideration of efficiencies because it is so difficult to 
establish and because it prevents consideration of even large efficiencies if there is only some probability 
that such efficiencies will be passed on to consumers”); accord U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTICIPATING 
THE 21ST CENTURY: CONSUMER PROTECTION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 
1–9 (1996), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/anticipating-21st-century-competition-
policy-new-high-tech-global-marketplace/gc_v2.pdf. 
 189 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Recapture, Pass-Through, and Market Definition, 76 
ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 592 (2010); Sonia Jaffe & E. Glen Weyl, The First-Order Approach to Merger 
Analysis, 5 AM. ECON. J. MICROECONOMICS 188, 188–89 (2013); see also David Balto, The Efficiency 
Defense in Merger Review: Progress or Stagnation, 16 ANTITRUST 74, 78 (Fall 2001) (noting the diffi-
culty of computing pass on when the merger increases the market structure so as to lessen the amount of 
competition); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., THE MERGER GUIDELINES AND THE INTEGRATION 
OF EFFICIENCIES INTO ANTITRUST REVIEW OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS (last visited Jan. 1, 2017) (the An-
titrust Division’s own statement, including a historical perspective, authored by William J. Kolasky & 
Andrew R. Dick), http://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/merger-guidelines-and-integration-efficiencies-an-
titrust-review-horizontal-mergers.  
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E. Merger Specific” Efficiencies: Important or Irrelevant? 
The Merger Guidelines emphasize that efficiencies must be “merger 
specific”—that is, the proponents of the merger must show that the efficien-
cies could not readily be attained other than by the challenged merger.190 This 
element is critical under a general welfare test, where the question is whether 
efficiencies serve to justify a merger that actually raises prices. If the same 
efficiencies could be generated without the merger, then society could have 
the efficiency's social gains without sustaining the merger's welfare losses. 
And, one of the best engines for producing efficiencies is competition—a 
merger might be a convenient way to achieving cost savings, but often com-
petition will work as well as or better than a merger, while leaving a more 
competitive market structure. 
But why must efficiencies be merger specific under the Merger Guide-
lines’ quasi-consumer welfare approach? The Guidelines require both that 
the efficiencies be of sufficient magnitude to reverse completely any price 
increase, and that the claimed efficiencies be merger specific.191 This ap-
proach is perplexing. First, if the efficiencies are not of sufficient magnitude 
to offset fully any propensity toward a price increase, then the efficiency de-
fense will be rejected whether or not the claimed efficiencies are merger spe-
cific. However, if the efficiencies are in fact of sufficient magnitude to pre-
dict that the post-merger price will be no higher than the pre-merger price, 
then why do we care? Such a merger does not harm consumers, and as a 
  
 190 See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10: 
The Agencies credit only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed mer-
ger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed merger or another 
means having comparable anticompetitive effects. These are termed merger-specific efficien-
cies. Only alternatives that are practical in the business situation faced by the merging firms 
are considered in making this determination. The Agencies do not insist upon a less restrictive 
alternative that is merely theoretical. 
The Guidelines add in a footnote, id § 10 n.13: 
The Agencies will not deem efficiencies to be merger-specific if they could be attained by 
practical alternatives that mitigate competitive concerns, such as divestiture or licensing. If a 
merger affects not whether but only when an efficiency would be achieved, only the timing 
advantage is a merger-specific efficiency. 
See also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 85 (D.D.C. 2015) (stating that claimed 
efficiencies are not shown to be merger specific when a substantial amount could be achieved by means 
other than merger); United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-CV-00133-WHO, 2014 WL 203966, at 
*50 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014) (where the court found that the defendants’ claimed defense that the merger 
would provide them with better quality marketing data were both conjectural and not merger specific, but 
also concluded that prices would rise); United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 90 (D.D.C. 
2011) (numerous claimed efficiencies including consolidation of debit card and other financial accounts 
neither verifiable or shown to be merger specific); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d 
26, 75 (D.D.C. 2009) (efficiency claim of increased innovation in the future rejected because it was not 
shown to be either verifiable or merger specific). 
 191 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 4. 
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result, is not anticompetitive. Indeed, such a merger  appears to be nearly a 
pure welfare improvement: it benefits the merging parties by reducing their 
costs. It makes consumers no worse off or else benefits them. The likely harm 
is to competitors of the post-merger firm, who must now compete against the 
merged firm’s reduced costs. In other words, if we consistently apply the 
consumer welfare approach that the Merger Guidelines lay out, we should 
not care if the efficiencies are merger specific, so long as the predicted post-
merger price is no higher than the pre-merger price. 
One possible reason for requiring merger specific efficiencies is that, if 
the efficiencies are attainable by some means other than a merger, the result 
might be lower prices and a consumer benefit via increased competition. In 
that case, consumers would be better off if the firm(s) in question attained 
their efficiencies by means other than a merger. While that might be factually 
true, this approach is difficult to reconcile with a statute that condemns mer-
gers only if they may “substantially lessen” competition, and not merely be-
cause they fail to benefit competition as much as some alternative.192 
For example, suppose that the government makes out a prima facie case 
that a merger will injure consumers by $4 million as a result of higher prices 
if efficiencies are ignored. The defendants are able to show an efficiency of 
$5 million, however, more than $4 million of which will be passed on. As a 
result, consumers are no worse off as a result of the merger. At that point the 
merger has been shown not to cause any competitive harm under the Merger 
Guidelines’ test, and it should not matter whether the efficiencies are merger 
specific. The challenger might say that the efficiencies could be attained by 
some other means and that, without the merger, prices would fall even fur-
ther. But that position is not justified by the language of Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, which condemns mergers only under a “lessen competition” 
standard.193 And, if instead it is shown that post-merger prices will be higher, 
then the efficiency defense will be rejected—once again, it does not matter 
whether the efficiencies are merger specific. 
F. Efficiencies Relating to Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights 
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines statement on efficiencies in-
clude two paragraphs on research, development, and innovation efficiencies: 
Other efficiencies, such as those relating to research and development, are poten-
tially substantial but are generally less susceptible to verification and may be the 
  
 192 See 5 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1127–31. This is one reason that both the Agen-
cies and the courts have largely abandoned the “actual potential entrant” doctrine of conglomerate mer-
gers. Under it, a merger was condemned on the theory that if the merger partner had entered the market 
de novo the market would have been more competitive, but the merger served to preserve the status quo. 
 193 Id. ¶ 1128d. 
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result of anticompetitive output reductions. Yet others, such as those relating to pro-
curement, management, or capital cost, are less likely to be merger-specific or sub-
stantial, or may not be cognizable for other reasons. 
When evaluating the effects of a merger on innovation, the Agencies consider the 
ability of the merged firm to conduct research or development more effectively. 
Such efficiencies may spur innovation but not affect short-term pricing. The Agen-
cies also consider the ability of the merged firm to appropriate a greater fraction of 
the benefits resulting from its innovations. Licensing and intellectual property con-
ditions may be important to this enquiry, as they affect the ability of a firm to ap-
propriate the benefits of its innovation. Research and development cost savings may 
be substantial and yet not be cognizable efficiencies because they are difficult to 
verify or result from anticompetitive reductions in innovative activities.194 
The Merger Guidelines do not mention whether the inefficiencies in 
these cases must apply to both of the merging firms or only one. It is rela-
tively easy to imagine situations where one laggard firm can improve its po-
sition by piggybacking on a more effective researcher. But in that scenario, 
an efficient firm is not being added to the market; such a merger serves only 
to protect an inefficient firm from the competitive process.195 
Is it conceivable that two firms, each in a disadvantaged position be-
cause of lack of innovation, can overcome their disadvantages through mer-
ger? Yes, but it is hard to see a situation in which such a gain would be merger 
specific.196 Most obviously, the firms could cross license as an alternative to 
merging in order to achieve the same result. Cross license agreements, par-
ticularly where they are nonexclusive, can give each firm access to the other’s 
technology without necessarily impairing competition between the two firms 
at all.197 Cross licensing need not be accompanied by product price fixing and 
would likely be unlawful if it did.198 By contrast, after the merger the two 
firms could set any joint price they wished. 
Research facilities may be a different matter, and could in some cases 
resemble production facilities more than research and development as such. 
For example, two firms might each have inadequate research facilities that 
could profit from being enlarged or modernized. Here, as is the case for pro-
duction facilities, the merger does not create a single efficient facility, but 
rather leaves the resulting firm with two inefficient ones. However, the mer-
ger might enable the post-merger firm to specialize its research, just as a mer-
ger of production facilities might enable increased plant specialization. If one 
facility conducts research of a given type while the other takes the remainder, 
  
 194 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10. 
 195 On the requirement that both pre-merger firms be inefficient, see discussion supra, text accom-
panying notes 101–102. 
 196 See 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 975g (which is severely skeptical). 
 197 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 467, 467–77 (2015) 
(noting that cross license agreements only impair competition if they go “beyond the scope”). 
 198 See id. at 524–29. 
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each might be able to operate at a more efficient scale and produce positive 
net results. 
Other efficiency claims relate to larger customer bases for intellectual 
property rights, but these should generally be rejected. For example, in 
United States v. Oracle Corp.,199 a merger challenge ultimately rejected on 
unrelated grounds, the court also rejected the argument that a merger of two 
software rivals would give the merged firm a larger customer base over 
which to spread the results of its research and development.200 The court did 
not reject the argument on principle. Instead, it found inadequate support in 
the record.201 Similarly, in Heinz, Heinz claimed that while merger partner 
Beech-Nut had an outmoded and inferior production facility, it had superior 
baby food recipes.202 The D.C. Circuit found that “recipe consolidation” that 
might occur when two producers of baby food merged was not merger spe-
cific.203  
One problem with arguments about IP sharing is how to limit them. 
Combining all of the world's word processing programs, tax programs, reci-
pes, or other competing commercial programs would certainly enlarge the 
customer base; right up to the point that one firm controlled 100% of the 
market. But one could say the same thing about fast food fried chicken or ice 
cream. If one ignores product and service differentiation, IP rights are natural 
monopolies. Once the first copy has been created, additional copies cost al-
most nothing. 
Of course, that is where the rub comes in. The reason that all of the 
world's software entertainment companies do not jointly produce the same 
game is that customers appreciate product variety just as they appreciate 
  
 199 United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 200 Id. at 1173–75. 
 201 Id. at 1775. 
 202 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 203 Id. at 721–22. As the court observed: 
[T]he district court never explained why Heinz could not achieve the kind of efficiencies urged 
without merger. As noted, the principal merger benefit asserted for Heinz is the acquisition of 
Beech-Nut’s better recipes, which will allegedly make its product more attractive and permit 
expanded sales at prices lower than those charged by Beech-Nut, which produces at an ineffi-
cient plant. Yet, neither the district court nor the appellees addressed the question whether 
Heinz could obtain the benefit of better recipes by investing more money in product develop-
ment and promotion—say, by an amount less than the amount Heinz would spend to acquire 
Beech-Nut. At oral argument, Heinz’s counsel agreed that the taste of Heinz’s products was 
not so bad that no amount of money could improve the brand’s consumer appeal. That being 
the case, the question is how much Heinz would have to spend to make its product equivalent 
to the Beech-Nut product and hence whether Heinz could achieve the efficiencies of merger 
without eliminating Beech-Nut as a competitor. The district court, however, undertook no in-
quiry in this regard. In short, the district court failed to make the kind of factual determinations 
necessary to render the appellees’ efficiency defense sufficiently concrete to offset the FTC’s 
prima facie showing. 
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lower cost. It must be remembered that these “enlarged customer base” argu-
ments are to be considered only after a prima facie case of illegality has been 
made out against a merger. In most cases, product differentiation preserves 
at least imperfect competition. By contrast, a merger unites the two firms into 
one. In any event, licensing of IP rights would almost always be an available 
alternative, so the claimed efficiency is not merger specific. 
In sum, once a prima facie case for a price-increasing merger has been 
made out, it is probably best to reject any argument that sharing of intellectual 
property rights is efficient because it enlarges the base over which sharing 
occurs. The rare exception might arise in relation to standardized products, 
like an electronic medical record system, where the interest in product dif-
ferentiation is very likely not substantial. For example, the St. Luke's decision 
considered the merging firms' defense that the merger would permit the post-
merger firm to have access to Epic, an electronic medical record system that 
St. Luke’s already had, but its merger partner did not.204 The court rejected 
the defense, not on principle, but because the claimed efficiency was found 
not to be merger specific, and in any event inadequate to counteract the pre-
dicted price increases.205  In any event, one wonders why licensing would not 
be a superior alternative to merger. 
CONCLUSION 
Merger analysis today depends more on economic models and simula-
tions than at any time in our history. That development is both good and im-
portant, but one must not forget that most judges have only a limited capacity 
to address the strengths and weaknesses of technical models. At the same 
time, the case law of mergers is descriptively thick and provides many alter-
native accounts of competition and business choices. This too is a good thing, 
because ultimately, the legal analysis has to fit the facts.206 The result that this 
creates is what appears to be heavy reliance on models in order to make pre-
dictions and also in the expert analysis that goes into preparation for litiga-
tion. Once judges listen to testimony and write their opinions, however, the 
accounts become descriptively thick and fact specific. 
In the final analysis, the effectiveness of merger policy depends on re-
sults, rather than any particular combination of analytic models and descrip-
tively rich stories. Although more empirical work needs to be done, what we 
  
 204 Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 778 F.3d 775, 791 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
 205 Id. at 791–92. 
 206 See e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D.D.C. 2000), rev’d, 246 
F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (a heavily modeled case in which the court relied mainly on a factually thick 
description of the parties’ business strategies, differences in technology, recipes, and distribution prac-
tices). 
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have at this time suggests that current merger policy, if anything, underesti-
mates competitive harm, exaggerates passed-on efficiencies, or produces 
some combination of both. 
Evidence of efficiencies has rarely succeeded in rebutting an accepted 
prima facie case of illegality. As a result, the fault must lie with the prima 
facie case, not with the efficiency defense. The defense is, if anything, too 
generous to the merging parties. This might call for reconsideration of Judge 
Posner's conclusion that the problem of merger-specific proof of efficiencies 
is intractable and should be abandoned.207 However, the one thing it does not 
do is suggest that we need to lighten the burden once it has shifted to defend-
ants. Not, at least, until there is evidence that many competitively harmless 
mergers are being condemned, and that is hardly where we are today. 
  
 207 See discussion supra, text accompanying notes 53–54. 
